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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the influence of social capital on the farmers’ perception of the soil 
erosion problem and the level of investments in soil conservation in marginal areas of Kenya. 
It uses data from a survey of 321 households in Machakos and Taita-Taveta Districts. A 
Heckman’s two-step model is applied to assess the influence of social capital on investments 
in soil conservation by farmers. Results show that the education level of the household head, 
slope of farmers’ fields, proportion of off-farm income, and the status of soil erosion are 
significant determinants of the likelihood of farmers recognizing soil erosion as an important 
problem. Household size, slope, land tenure security, membership diversity, age of household 
head, farm size per capita and membership in groups influence investments in soil control 
measures such as terraces. The effects, however, are location-specific. The policy challenge 
is to establish and strengthen social capital elements that have a strong influence on 
communities undertaking soil conservation measures to promote sustainable agriculture, and 
improve land tenure security.  
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Introduction   
Land degradation and declining agricultural productivity are common features in many 
developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). These phenomena have been 
attributed to the inappropriate traditional land tenure systems of managing agricultural land. 
Among the indicators of land degradation is soil erosion
1. Farmers singularly depend on land 
                                                   
1 Other forms of soil degradation are damages to physical and chemical properties of soil, reduction in moisture 
capacity, and soil mining.   3 
for their livelihoods. It is uncommon for them not to be aware of serious soil degradation 
unless they are either recent immigrants to a new agro-ecological zone or the process of 
degradation has not yet significantly affected yields (Scherr, 1999).  
 
In Kenya, most rural resource poor households are concentrated on low potential lands where 
inadequate or unreliable rainfall, adverse soil conditions and topography limit agricultural 
production and increase the risk of land degradation. Attempts of such households to improve 
their livelihoods often lead to over-exploitation of land and water resources. Consequently, 
resource management by poor households is crucial in addressing poverty and other 
development challenges in Kenya.  
 
Land degradation in Kenya manifests itself in depletion of natural capital such as forests and 
soil resources. This situation is worse in the marginal lands, which constitute about 80 
percent of the total agricultural land, largely due to increasing human and animal population. 
People in these regions are faced with frequent food shortages. Soil erosion and soil mining 
are prominent characteristics of land use in these ecologically fragile areas. While efforts 
have been made to motivate land users to efficiently use the land resource, soil conservation 
has been given limited attention in agricultural policy.  
 
While several studies have looked at factors influencing soil conservation investments (e.g. 
Tiffen et al., 1994; Shiferaw and Holden, 1998), limited attention has been given to the role 
of  social capital. Yet social interactions (i.e. social capital)  matter as they create social 
networks, foster trust and values, sustain norms and culture, and influence economic and 
social outcomes (Quibria, 2003).  
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Social capital has been variously defined. For example, as an aggregate of actual and 
potential resources linked to membership in a group (Bourdiew, 1986) or as a stock of trust 
and emotional attachment to a group (Coleman, 1988). It has also been referred to as tacit 
knowledge, a collection of networks,  an aggregation of reputations, and organizational 
capital (Stiglitz, 1999) or as features of social organization such as networks, norms and 
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putman, 1995), 
which this study embraces. It is argued that if soil erosion presents a potential threat to 
livelihoods, the society will get concerned and mobilize resources to mitigate potential 
negative consequences.  
There has been a great debate about the role of social capital in economic growth (Collier 
and Gunning, 1999 ); in missing capital and insurance markets (van Bastelaer, 2000); in 
collective action and provision of local public goods (Otsuka and Tachibana, 2001) or 
about its measurement (Quibria, 2003). Notwithstanding, there are merits of considering 
social capital (Cramb, 1993). 
 
Agricultural production is often influenced by the level of conventional inputs such as 
physical capital and labour. However, social capital can complement the process. There is 
glaring paucity of information regarding the contribution of social capital in soil conservation 
in a marginally agricultural setting in Kenya. For example, Frank et al., (2002) analyzed the 
effect of group structural variables on performance in an activity like tree nurseries in high 
potential zones and less favourable zones, while de Haan et al., (1996) examined the 
performance of dairy groups in high potential zones in Kenya. In the Philippines, Cramb 
(2004) examines the effect of social capital on terracing. This paper aims to fill this gap in 
empirical literature.   
Methodology   5 
Study sites 
The study was conducted in a transition zone between semi-arid and semi-humid areas of 
Kenya, depending on altitude. In these areas, the crop season is short and averages between 
115 and 145 growing days and experience between 15 and 24
0C mean diurnal temperatures. 
Maize intercrop with beans or pigeon peas predominate in these largely mixed crop-livestock 
agricultural systems (Mwakubo et al., 2004). Rainfall is erratic with frequent flush floods 
that expose soils to rapid erosion. Households in these areas frequently experience crop 
failures and food shortages. 
 
Survey data was gathered from 321 rural households in agriculturally marginal lower 
midlands of Machakos District and in relatively productive coastal lowlands of Taita-Taveta 
District in 2003. Four administrative units were chosen in each study area on the basis of 
contrasting terracing density and physical infrastructural endowments such as road network. 
Two administrative units with higher terracing density but one with higher and the other 
lower physical infrastructural endowments were selected in each district. Likewise, two 
administrative units with lower terracing density but one with higher and the other lower 
physical infrastructural endowments were also selected. A village was then selected 
randomly from each of the administrative units. The survey instrument was administered to 
40 randomly selected households in each village, which is about 15% of the village sample 
and therefore representative.  
 
The model 
Conceptually, investments in soil erosion conservation depends on the farmer’s perception of 
the severity of the soil erosion problem. Depending on the perception, farmers opt to mitigate 
the consequences of the erosion problem or ignore. The outcome of the farmers’ decision   6 
will be observed in soil conservation measures such as terraces. The perception model 
permits selection of households that have invested in terracing. Acknowledgement of a soil 
erosion problem precedes an investment decision. The outcome (i.e. observed terraces) is as 
a result of a two-step process. Following Greene (2000) the model consists of two equations. 
The first equation is the “selection equation,” captured by the perception of soil erosion 
function, which is expressed as:  




i 1 = + g =    (1) 
where 
*
i z  is a latent variable, g is a Kx1 vector of parameters, 
'
i w is a 1xK row vector of 
observations on K exogenous variables and  i u is a random disturbance. The latent variable 













    (2) 
The second equation is a linear model that captures the soil erosion control efforts, which is 
indicated by the terracing intensity
 .  It is given as: 
n N n i e x y i i i > = + = , ,....., 1 , 㬠
'   (3) 
where  i y  is an observable random variable, 㬠  is an Mx1 vector of parameters, 
'
i x  is a 1xM 
vector of exogenous variables and  i e is a random disturbance.  
To avoid a “selectivity problem” which arises when  i y  is observed when  i z = 1, and if  㰐 ≠ 0; 
a two-step estimation procedure is employed (Heckman, 1979). The basis for this estimation 
procedure is the conditional regression function expressed as: 








i i i i i x w u | e E x 㬰 w u | y E z | y E l rs + b = g - > + b = - > = > 0   (4)   7 
where  i 㮰 is the “inverse Mill’s ratio,” f(￿) is the standard normal probability density 
evaluated at the argument, and F(￿) is the cumulative distribution function for the standard 
normal variable evaluated at the argument. The Mill’s ration ( i 㮰 ) depends only on unknown 
parameters of (1) which can be estimated by a Probit procedure.   
  
Consequently, the perception of soil erosion problem selection Probit and primary terracing 
intensity least square regression models are specified as: 
) min , ,
, , , , , , , , (
come offfar fractionof erosion extension
sex ion participat groups diversity membership tenure slope education age f perception =
(5) 
and  
) , , , , , min
, , , , cos , , , , (
extension sex ion participat groups diversity membership come offar fractionof
income tenure slope ts transport rcapita farmsizepe familysize education age f terrace =
  (6) 
The elements of social capital in the study include: groups, membership diversity, and 
household participation in decision making within a group. The groups variable is the 
number of groups to which members of a household belong to. Membership diversity was 
measured by rating according to five criteria: religion, gender, age, political affiliation, and 
education. A diversity index was calculated for each organization, ranging from one to two 
(1=same, 2=different) and then summed up per household. With participation, two questions 
were asked to respondents to (i) evaluate the relative roles of their leaders and members in 
decision-making and, (ii) evaluate the effectiveness of their leaders. The responses were 
combined in a “democratic functioning score” to determine the participation score in 
decision-making. These scores were evaluated for each household. Details are discussed in 
Mwakubo et al., (2004). 
 
Survey Results   8 
Household characteristics  
The descriptive statistics for selected variables are presented in Table 1. The average age of 
the household head is higher in areas that are distant from major markets (e.g. Taita-Taveta 
district) compared with more urbanized areas (e.g. Machakos district), reflecting differences 
in the extent of rural-urban migration. The same applies to the mean values of perception of 
the soil erosion problem and the gender of the household head. Individual perception of the 
soil erosion problem, and the subsequent negative effects, would spur action that would 
mitigate the effects that would arise from non-intervention. Soil erosion or generally soil 
degradation is a process that takes a long time for the consequences to be appreciated and 
only then if those affected are able to directly associate them to that process. 
 
The mean terrace length per hectare in areas that are close to major urban centres is higher 
and those that are distant. This shows that even in marginal areas, there are significant 
differences in soil conservation investments. This may be due to soil conservation campaigns 
and higher values that are placed on land in order to supply farm produce to nearby high-
income urban dwellers. The mean values of farm slope index, education level of household 
head and the land tenure system also vary although the values are not significantly different.  
 
Perception of soil erosion and determinants of terracing intensity 
The sigma values from the Heckman’s two-step process are greater than zero, which shows 
that the two equations are independent (Table 2). The Wald c
2 statistics are significant 
indicating the rejection of the null hypotheses, which posit that the estimated coefficients are 
equal to zero. The Mills’ lambda is significant with respect to one of the study sites, which 
means that selection is important. 
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The age of household head coefficient is positive for distant marginal areas (Taita-Taveta). 
Older household heads are more likely to acknowledge soil erosion as an important problem 
and will seek to construct terraces to reduce soil erosion than younger farmers. Areas that are 
close to urban areas have more opportunities for off-farm activities, especially for young 
people. Consequently, the mean age of households is lower compared to relatively more 
distant areas. The location variable is negative and significant implying that soil conservation 
investments in marginal areas are location-specific. This has to do with learning and coping 
mechanisms that differ in these areas.  
 
Per capita farm size has negative and significant effect on terracing intensity in areas with 
lower population density. Higher average land size implies less pressure on land for various 
uses by households and subsequently there is less motivation for intensified terracing of 
farms. Nonetheless, the effects of erosion will be more be discernible on larger than smaller 
fields. The slope of the farm is positive and significant on terracing intensity in areas that are 
closer to urban markets. The pooled results are also similar. There is generally easier flow of 
information including that about soil conservation measures through the agricultural 
extension services besides the need to raise agricultural production to supply the high-value 
urban markets. 
 
Security of land tenure has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of observing 
intensified terracing for soil conservation in marginal areas. This suggests that farm 
households with insecure land tenure rights are less likely to make any significant 
investments in soil conservation measures. This finding is consistent with other empirical 
evidence from elsewhere (e.g. Shiferaw and Holden, 1998). The education variable does not 
significantly influence terracing intensity. This is a surprising result since education is   10 
expected to have a significant bearing on resource management on the farm including 
terracing. Possibly, the more educated people are, the more likely they will secure off-farm 
jobs and their managerial inputs on farm level activities may be significantly less. 
 
Density of membership in groups and membership diversity significantly shape terracing 
intensity in marginal areas. Where density of memberships is higher, terracing intensity is 
also higher. Groups positively affect soil conservation investments through labour exchange 
and the inherent social or peer pressure besides the non-costly acquisition of information. 
However, membership diversity negatively influences terracing intensity. This is an 
interesting result since it implies that a heterogeneous group presents greater opportunities 
for soil conservation information sharing would be wrong. Possibly, this is likely to create 
conflicts. As Balland and Platteau (1996) argue, collective action is usually more successful 





The study has established that social capital have a significant role to play in soil 
conservation in marginal areas. It is also of various forms and don’t act in the same direction. 
The attributes of social capital are membership into groups, membership diversity and 
participation. Generally these components of social capital do not influence the likelihood of 
acknowledging awareness of the soil erosion problem. This finding is surprising since 
extensive interaction in social groups would be expected to influence perception of soil 
erosion as an important problem especially in food insecure environments, such as in 
marginal areas of Kenya. It seems to suggest therefore that policy makers need not worry   11 
about the participation in decision-making by members of groups. Membership diversity 
influences terrace intensity but negatively implying that efforts should be geared towards its 
reduction. The more of the number of groups that household members belong to, the higher 
the likelihood of a household intensifying investments in terraces in an effort to control the 
soil erosion problem. Other variables that are important are land tenure security, farm size 
per capita and age of household head.  
 
The policy challenge therefore is to devise innovative and cost-effective measures to 
encourage household membership into groups. Since collective action is more successful 
with smaller groups, it is worthy to increase the number of groups. Improving land tenure 
security would also significantly contribute to increased terracing, and thus contribute to 
higher farm production, increased incomes and sustainable agriculture in marginal areas.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of  selected variables 
Machakos  Taita-Taveta 
Variable/ measurement 
   N  Mean  Std. Deviation  N  Mean  Std. Deviation 
t-value
a 
Age (yrs)  146  47.82  14.85  144  51.49  15.02  -2.097** 
education (yrs)  151  6.82  3.91  105  7.24  3.84  -0.85 
terraces (metres)  152  951.07  1293.83  144  613.66  2098.68  1.675* 
family size (persons)   152  6.03  2.61  144  6.47  2.75  -0.408 
Farm size percapita 
(ha/person)  149  0.35  0.58  144  0.46  0.65  -0.421 
Transport costs (ksh)   152  107.17  19.13  144  90.42  36.58  4.974*** 
Slope (increasing 
scale)  149  2.33  0.87  140  2.19  0.85  1.307 
tenure(increasing 
scale)  148  5.90  1.24  144  5.85  0.99  0.368 
income (Ksh)  152  63162.63  181637.56  140  43537.48  88332.86  1.158 
Income per capita 
(Ksh/person)  152  1153.65  27930.00  140  8447.67  22297.19  0.91 
Farm size (ha)  149  1.98  3.47  144  2.54  3.31  -1.425 
fraction of off-farm 
income  152  0.33  0.36  140  0.28  0.36  1.155** 
perception (0,1)  152  0.59  0.49  144  0.74  0.44  -2.757*** 
membership diversity 
(index)  125  14.48  7.24  67  14.03  8.33  0.389 
groups (index)  152  1.24  0.91  144  0.72  0.98  4.744*** 
participation (index)  125  7.53  4.56  67  7.07  3.96  0.686 
Erosion (0,1)  151  0.89  0.32  143  0.79  0.41  2.286** 
Sex (0,1)  152  0.93  0.26  144  0.80  0.40  3.293*** 
Extension (0,1)  149  0.21  0.41  143  0.34  0.48  -2.599*** 
Note: Std. means standard; N is the number of respondents 
a Mean difference test with equal variances assumed 
 
* P< 0.10, ** P <0.05 and ***P<0.01.   15 
 
Table 2: Heckman’s two-step regression results  
Machakos (N=113)  Taita-Taveta (N=45)  Pooled (N=158) 
Variable 
Coefficient  Std. Err.  Coefficient  Std. Err.   Coefficient  Std. Err 
Step one: Perception equation: a Probit specification 
age  -0.004  0.003  -0.007*  0.004  0.0016  0.0046 
education  -0.046***  0.013  -0.009  0.014  -0.0233  0.0166 
slope  0.090*  0.051  -0.033  0.060  0.1234*  0.0712 
tenure  -0.098**  0.040  0.064  0.062  -0.0642  0.0557 
Fraction of offarm 
income  -0.517***  0.113  0.081  0.123  -0.5350***  0.1643 
Membership 
diversity  0.018  0.040  -0.037  0.034  -0.0634  0.0508 
groups  -0.396  0.411  0.363  0.344  0.4667  0.4938 
participation  0.031  0.030  0.021  0.022  0.0120  0.0294 
erosion  0.524***  0.141  0.806***  0.110  0.6745***  0.1689 
sex  0.007  0.184  0.091  0.111  -0.2327  0.1918 
extension  -0.228**  0.107  -0.165  0.112  -0.1825  0.1364 
constant  1.354***  0.391  0.165  0.431  0.6116  0.5040 
Step two: terraces  selection equation 
district          -1.3113***  0.3891 
age  -0.021  0.030  0.115*  0.069  0.0259*  0.0138 
education  -0.112  0.110  -0.228  0.221  0.0402  0.0468 
family size  0.691**  0.285  -0.859*  0.456  0.0839  0.0712 
farm size percapita  1.250  1.189  -4.988*  2.683  -0.1901  0.2089 
transport costs  -0.019  0.018  -0.026  0.017  -0.0032  0.0056 
slope  1.111**  0.520  1.194  0.738  0.3756*  0.2024 
tenure  0.765**  0.331  -1.599*  0.894  0.1741  0.1355 
income  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.0000  0.0000 
faror  -0.492  0.896  -4.166  2.593  -0.4911  0.3951 
membership 
diversity  -1.106**  0.544  -0.763  0.704  -0.3403**  0.1336 
groups  11.055**  5.458  5.635  6.248  3.2036**  1.2876 
participation  -0.206  0.212  0.288  0.444  -0.0351  0.0879 
erosion  1.160  0.820  -1.703  2.186  0.2736  0.3940 
sex  -4.483  3.369  -1.806  1.933  -1.2738**  0.6308 
extension  -1.217  0.749  0.741  0.995  -0.1516  0.3342 
Constant  0.107    17.755  11.972  0.8873  1.5373 
Mills lambda  -0.370**  0.186  -0.168  0.166  0.6314  0.3064 
rho  -0.948    -0.756    1.0000   
sigma  0.390    0.223    0.6314   
lambda  -0.370  0.186  -0.168  0.166  0.6314  0.3064 
Wald c
2(22)  79.91  89.36  49.17   
Note: Std. Err. denotes standard error 
*P< 0.10, **P <0.05 and ***P<0.01. 
 